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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: June 11th, 2023

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  • Hanlon’s Razor is all well and good as a heuristic, but tends to lead to people discounting malice much too often.

    There’s definitely scenarios where that is the case.

    Also, I really didn’t say we were “under attack”

    I would describe a massive influx of spambots as an attack on a social media platform. It’s my characterization. I didn’t mean to imply that you said it.



  • Lemmy is a federated system and these stats are self-reported by user maintained systems. Rather than a sudden influx of users (bots or otherwise), a misconfigured system or hiccup in stats collection seems more likely.

    Generally, Hanlon’s Razor, add applied to computing: Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity user error.

    There’s a lot of malicious systems out there, but there is little corroborating evidence indicating that we’re under attack.






  • I guess that’s why you pay your soldiers.

    In the early summer of 2024, months before the opposition launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression, a mobile application began circulating among a group of Syrian army officers. It carried an innocuous name: STFD-686, a string of letters standing for Syria Trust for Development.

    The STFD-686 app operated with disarming simplicity. It offered the promise of financial aid, requiring only that the victim fill out a few personal details. It asked innocent questions: “What kind of assistance are you expecting?” and “Tell us more about your financial situation.”

    Determining officers’ ranks made it possible for the app’s operators to identify those in sensitive positions, such as battalion commanders and communications officers, while knowing their exact place of service allowed for the construction of live maps of force deployments. It gave the operators behind the app and the website the ability to chart both strongholds and gaps in the Syrian army’s defensive lines. The most crucial point was the combination of the two pieces of information: Disclosing that “officer X” was stationed at “location Y” was tantamount to handing the enemy the army’s entire operating manual, especially on fluid fronts like those in Idlib and Sweida.